Charles de Gaulle: President Roosevelt kept the document (the proposed agreement between the CFLN and the Allies for the liberation of France) on his table from month to month. Meanwhile, in the United States, an Allied military government (AMGOT) was being set up to take over the administration of France. All kinds of theorists, technicians, businessmen, propagandists and former Frenchmen naturalized as Yankees flocked to this organization. The steps (Jean) Monnet and (Henri) Hoppenot thought should be taken in Washington, the observations the British government was making to the United States, the urgent requests Eisenhower was sending to the White House, all failed to bring about any change. However, since something had to be done, Roosevelt decided in April to instruct (Dwight) Eisenhower that the Commander-in-Chief would have supreme power in France. As such, he was to choose the French authorities who would collaborate with him. We soon learned that Eisenhower was urging the President not to burden him with this political responsibility, and that the British disapproved of such an arbitrary procedure. But Roosevelt, with a few changes to the letter of his instructions, had maintained the essence of them. To tell the truth, the President’s intentions seemed to me to be of the same order as Alice in Wonderland’s dreams. Roosevelt had already ventured into North Africa, under conditions far more favourable to his designs, with a political enterprise similar to the one he was contemplating for France. Nothing remained of this attempt. My government exercised unfettered authority in Corsica, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Black Africa. The people Washington had counted on to stand in the way had disappeared from the scene. No one cared about the Darlan-Clark agreement (transfer of power from the French colonial Empire to the United States), which was considered null and void by the Comité de la Libération Nationale (Free France), and which I had solemnly declared at the Consultative Assembly that, in France’s eyes, did not exist. I regretted for him and for our relations that the failure of his policy in Africa had not been able to overcome Roosevelt’s illusions. But I was sure that his project, carried over to Metropolitan France, would not even begin to be applied there. The Allies would meet in France no other ministers and no other civil servants than those I would have set up. They would find no French troops other than those under my command. I could confidently challenge Eisenhower to deal validly with someone I had not appointed. In fact, he wouldn’t even dream of it. https://wordsmith.social/protestation/quotes#quote4922